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ABSTRACT

Until Judge Sweet's decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office (Myriad), gene patentability in the United States has evaded prohibition for more than three
decades since Diamond v. Chakrabarty. The Myriad decision has captured the imagination of the
legal community-but not in isolation. This article examines Myriad through the lens of two
contemporary European decisions related to gene patenting, Eli Lilly & Co. u Human Genome
Sciences, Inc and Monsanto Technology LLC v. Cefetra BV, suggesting that Myriad is a narrative
that evolves at the intersection of law's aspiration, humanity's common heritage, and corporate
realities of the twenty-first century. The article examines the possibility of a future paradigm
related to common heritage and distributive justice.
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INTERPRETING MYRIAD: ACQUIRING PATENT LAW'S MEANING
THROUGH CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE AND HUMANISTIC
VIEWPOINT OF COMMON HERITAGE OF DNA
SABY GHOSHRAY*

INTRODUCTION

As we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, the contentious issue
of gene patenting seems to be acquiring a new legal meaning, driven in part by the
series of court decisions invalidating isolated gene patents. Despite calls for courts to
revisit the issue, gene patentability continued to evade the prohibition for more than
three decades, until Judge Sweet's Myriad' district court opinion. Myriad captured
the imagination of the legal community, not only due to its sudden shift in focus, but
also for the sweeping implication it signals for the future of biotechnology in general
and the human genome project in particular. 2 Myriad, however, did not come in
ephemeral isolation, as I shall examine its implication through the lens of
contemporary European decisions in gene patenting. Nor did Myriad evolve in a
linear fashion, as can be seen through this article's trajectory, tracing a number of
significant areas in the gene patent dispute. Therefore, in this article, I present
Myriad as a narrative that evolves at the intersection of law's aspiration, humanity's
common heritage and corporate realities of the twenty-first century. To understand
the future of this narrative is to allow ourselves a retrospective inquest into its
backdrop.
Beginning in the twentieth century, technological advancement in molecular
genetics began colliding with increased corporatization, bringing to the surface issues
over gene patents. 3 As the socio-economic realities of gene patenting's exclusivity
began to illuminate the collective consciousness of the masses, awareness for its
economic deprivation came to surface. 4 This deprivation resulted from an ever*C Saby Ghoshray 2011. Dr. Saby Ghoshray specializes in Constitutional Law, International
Law, Capital Jurisprudence, Military Tribunals, and cyberspace law, among others. His work has
appeared in Albany Law Review, ILSLA Journal of International and Comparative Law, European
Law Journal ERA-Forum, Toledo Law Review, Georgetown International Law Review, Temple
Political & Civil Rights Law, Fordham International Law Journal, and New England Law Review,
to name a few. The author would like to thank Jennifer Schulke for her assistance in legal research
and typing of the manuscript, and his beautiful children, Shreyoshi and Sayantan, for their patience
and understanding. Dr. Ghoshray can be reached at sabyghoshray@sbcglobal.net.
1Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad), 702 F. Supp. 2d
181 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. July 6, 2010).
2 See, e.g., Josh Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Judge Invalidates Human Gene Patent, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, at Bi.

3See Andrew W. Torrance, GJene Concepts, GJene Talk, and (Gene Patents, 11 MVINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 157, 181 (2010).
4 See GREENPEACE USA, STUDY: THE TRUE COST OF GENE PATENTS: THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PATENTING GENES AND LIVING ORGANISMS 4, 10-11 (2004) [hereinafter
GREENPEACE
STUDY],
available at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/report/2007/7/
the-true-cost-of-gene-patents.pdf.
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increasing array of patents trying to reach the finish lines of patent acceptability,
most often sacrificing broader societal utility at the altar of economic incentive for
the few. 5 This explosion of patents began to challenge traditional conception of
patentable subject matter, as the question of limits began straddling the intersection
of ethics, morality, and legal policy. 6
Since its very inception, the discussion of the patentability framework has
acquired multiple hues, often unfolding as a quintessential dispute between
maximalist-versus-minimalist positions, 7 at times questions of a patent's exclusivity
acquired meaning through the struggle between have and the have-nots. 8
Patentability discussions promising to identify appropriate legal landscape, often
times, gets shaped by our obligation to our common heritage of humanity, prompting
us to consider a set of threshold questions protruding the ethical boundaries of patent
law: such as, whose gene is it anyway? 9 Can we take the seeds away from the
farmers? How much bacterial toxin can we inject into the plant? In the continuing
saga of exploration and invention, these types of existential questions have always
shaped legal framework-from the disputes over the rights of minerals within the
sea beds, 10 to exploration of outer-space. 11 The battle on patentability of biological
inventions premised on claiming the common heritage of humanity1 2 is no exception.
5 See id. at 5.
6 See Annabelle Lever, Ethics and the Patenting of Human Genes, J. PHIL. SCI. & L. (Nov.
2001), http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/archives/papers/ethicslever.html;
Theo Papaioannou,
Human Gene Patents and the Question of Liberal Morality, 4 GENOMICS SOC'Y & POL'Y 64, 79-80
(2008), http://www.hss.ed.ac.uk/genomics/V4N3/pdfs/Papaioannou.pdf (arguing that issuance of gene
patents leads to "information feudalism").
7The term "maximalist" is used to describe a position/theme and emphasis is placed on the
inclusion of all factors possible associated with the position. Whereas, the term "minimalist" is used
to describe a position/theme and emphasis is placed on eliminating any extra factors and reducing
down to only the necessary elements.
8See James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What the Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could
Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 97, 107-08 (F. Scott
Kieff ed., 2003) (discussing maximalist and minimalist perspectives on gene patenting).
9 See Annabelle Lever, Is it Ethical to Patent Human Genes?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THEORIES OF JUSTICE 246, 252 (Axel Gosseries et al. eds., 2008).
10See, e.g., Martin A. Harry, The Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind or Arena for
Unilateral Exploitation?, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 207, 207-08 (1992); Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
11See Linda Billings, To the Moon, Mars, and Beyond: Culture, Law, and Ethics in SpaceFaring Societies, 26 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC'Y 430, 430-37; Lynn M. Fountain, Creating the
Momentum in Space: Ending the ParalysisProduced by the "Common Heritage of Man" Doctrine, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1753, 1753-54 (2003).
12See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. I, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. 205 (codifying the "Common Heritage of Mankind" principle for first time). The treaty
states in Article I:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the
province of all mankind. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of
any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and
there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be freedom of
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Garnering traction in our legal discourse since the 1970s, riding the interpretative
gloss of the United States Supreme Court's path-breaking decision in Diamond us.
Chakrabarty,13 gene patentability has assumed a paradoxical legal contour of late. 1 4
Patent law's confusing conundrum stems partly from law's inability to catch up with
the inventions, partly from policy's inadequacy to synchronize human welfare with
corporate monopoly rent-seeking behavior. 15 As a result, difficulties, discrepancies
and inequalities in sharing the fruits of human ingenuity began to take center stage
in policy discussions in two distinct areas:
(i) biotechnological invention for
agriculturel 6 and (ii) molecular biological discoveries related to human genes. 17
The final quarter of the previous century saw the mad rush to patent inventions
as biotechnology companies and research institutions brought tens of thousands of
genes into the protective umbrella of exclusivity, primarily relying on the premise
that an isolated gene or DNA sequence is different than its naturally occurring
precursor. 18 A general acquiescence into this premise within the patentability
framework allowed a rapid surge of genetically modified ("GM") food crops in

scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in
such investigation.
Id. See also Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, G.A.
Res. 34/68, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/68 (Dec. 5, 1979); Antarctic Treaty art. VI, Dec. 1, 1959, 12
U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187; Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
13Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) (upholding the patentability of manmade bacteria that devours oil droplets in the ocean).
14See discussion infra Part I.
15 By "corporate rent-seeking," I generally draw attention to the corporate practices where the
corporate entity attempts to derive economic benefits by extracting economic rent via manipulating
the existing socio-political landscape. In this context, rent-seeking occurs as the corporate entity
extracts additional value by various means, such as imposing barriers to entry to other competitors
or developing unilateral ability to fix a higher than normal market price. The term "monopoly" is
included in the description to capture a unique dimension of such uncompensated value extraction
in that the corporate entity enjoys monopoly privileges under the guidance of legal or regulatory
framework. Originally introduced in 1967, the concept of "rent-seeking" was formalized in 1974 and
identified as distinct from the basic profit-seeking behavior of economic agents. See generally
Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 225 (1967)
(introducing the idea of "rent-seeking"); Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974) (formalizing the same concept). In the present context, I
draw a distinction between profit-seeking and rent-seeking behaviors of bio-technology companies,
where the former engages in mutually agreeable financial transactions within an efficient market
environment, but where the later extracts abnormal profits in a skewed market environment by
foreclosing other competitors' meaningful opportunities to compete due to patent exclusivity for a
significant period of time.
'8 See GREENPEACE STUDY, supra note 4, at 16.
17See Thomas A. Hemphill, Gene Patents, the Anticommons, and the Biotechnology Industry,
53 RESEARCH TECH. MGMT. 11, 12 (2010).
18 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092-93 (Jan. 5, 2001) (adopting
new guidelines and responding to specific comments submitted in response to proposed guidelines
affecting gene patentability).
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agriculture, 19 while the splicing and sequencing of genes continued unabated in
molecular biology. 20 Driven by a misconception that current agricultural production
is neither sustainable nor productive in the long run, patenting an agricultural seed's
DNA sequence gained both legal legitimacy and social acceptance, allowing giant
multinational corporations like Monsanto 21 to become the Microsoft of the GM food
business. 22 On the other hand, as the idea of isolating genes acquired legal
acceptance on a broader level, molecular genetics corporations began a monopolistic
foray into gene-based diagnostic testing, much to the chagrin of the deprived
masses. 23 Deprived, because they are now staring at a new form of preventive
paradigm-prevention not from disease but from acquiring the fruits of genetic
advancement. 24
The monopolistic uses of gene patents have a two-fold detrimental impact. First,
due to exclusivity of rights granted to the patent owner, the broader scientific
community and research institutions are unable to access new innovations or work
on improvements. 25 Second, the cost-prohibitive nature of these inventions precludes
their access to the expanded community of patients and caregivers. In an alarming
array of recent instances, the genetic diagnostic testing companies have either
withdrawn from providing patients with service or done so at exorbitant prices. 26
Their vantage position as the sole provider of such advanced diagnostics has
conferred on them the ability to exhibit such monopoly rent-seeking behavior. Albeit,
a faulty framework of patentability 27 has allowed biotechnology companies to unleash
such existential chaos in human survivability 28 that opens up a Pandora's Box full of
19See Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2009 The First Fourteen Years,
1996 to 2009, INT'L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS,
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/41/executivesummary/default.asp.
20 Denise Caruso, A Challenge to Gene Theory, a Tougher Look at Biotech, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2007, § 3, at 3.
21In 2005 and 2006, Monsanto brought an action against the Dutch importer, Cefetra for
infringement of its European Patent, EP 0 546 090. Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra
BV, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 396. Monsanto's patent protects a soy plant it has called "Roundup
Ready" and includes claims to both isolated DNA sequences and specific DNA sequences. Id.
22 See Roger Parloff, Seeds of Discord, Monsanto's Gene Police Raise Alarm on Farmer's Rights,
Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al.
23 See Lever, supra note 6, at 12.
24 See George Bullwinkel, Who Owns Your Genes?, GEORGE BULLWINKEL (Apr. 4, 2010),
http://www.bullwinkel.com/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=55&Itemid=70.
Corporations are erecting an insurmountable financial hurdle by virtue of making genetic
inventions exclusive. Consider some of the costs: "Myriad charges $3,000 per test, doesn't take
Medicare, and by virtue of its heavily reinforced patent position has no U.S. Competitors. (Canada
refuses to recognize Myriad's patents. There, a test costs only $1,000.)" Id.
25 See GREENPEACE STUDY, supra note 4, at 6.
26 See Bullwinkel, supra note 24.
27 See Kenneth G. Chahine, Anchoring Gene Patent Eligibility to its ConstitutionalMooring, 28
NATURE BIOTECH. 1251, 1252 (2010) (noting that patentability decisions are "best rationalized based
on how judges perceive the invention rather than any available legal theory").
28 This existential chaos draws its meaning from the interaction between human productivity
and environmental sustainability. For example, in agricultural biotechnology, injecting human
intelligence to modify genetic codes of food grains has opened up a lot of existential threats for
humanity. First, given the uncertainty where the newly introduced gene might land in the broader
genomic array, it is not entirely possible to predict the final outcome, both of the formulated new
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complex questions-questions surrounding human genes' relationships with the
function of its DNA and the basic tenants of patentability-in an area that is
beginning to acquire new meaning.
So, is there a single flashpoint-a path-breaking doctrinal development in law
that energized this patent race? Indeed, Chakrabarty'spatentability framework, one
that "include [s] anything under the sun" that had "markedly different
characteristics" from prior art is capable of being patented, broadened the scope of
gene patentability in 1980.29 This corporate race for DNA patenting, both in
agricultural food processing and in human genome based genetic diagnostic testing
industries, has been continuing on ever since, punctuated only periodically by
isolated instances of judicial inquiry. 30 Not until later did we begin to see policy
developments attempting to align legal requirements with biotechnology's meteoric
evolution, with initiatives both in the European Union ("EU") and in the United
States. 31 Implementation of these initiatives resulted in significant doctrinal
development in law over the last three years, unfolding through three constitutional
cases in three different countries. 32
Indeed, these judicial decisions send us an unmistakable signal that, the courts
are beginning to break away from the minimalist protectionist paradigm. As I shall
establish in this article, this shift away from the minimalist framework is a growing
recognition by the courts of the need for a stricter patentability framework. 33 This
framework would justifiably put a brake on patent explosion by aligning a claimed
invention of a gene or DNA sequence with functional specificity and inherent
distinguishability. 34 This is revealed in Myriad; it is in Judge Sweet's Southern
District of New York ruling that we find invalidation of gene patents on the basis of a
revised framework of patentability. 35
In eerily similar veins, two different court systems across the Atlantic also
embarked on revising their patentability requirements. In the case of El Lilly & Co.
v. Human Genome Sciences,36 Justice Kitchin of the Chancery Division Patents Court
in the United Kingdom restricted the scope of gene patentability in the U.K. by
observing that the existing patent disclosure is academically broad. 37 In invalidating
gene sequence and also of the long-term impact of bacterial toxin, routinely being introduced in the
name of pesticides.
Second, the issue of gene flow via pooling-that is, the unwarranted
consequences of either unwanted genes ending up in related plant, or the movement of genes freely
across species-issues that have largely been kept out of current discourses. Humanity's existential
danger lurking beneath the avalanche of biological pollution, therefore, must be looked through a
new prism. This prism exists not in the far-fetched outer limit of corporatization of agriculture but
persisted too long in the absence of legal sensibility and logical prudence.
29 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 441 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
30See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(upholding broad scope of a human genome-related patent).
31 See infra Part I.
32See Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Human Genome Sciences, [2008] EWHC
(Pat) 1903, [2008] R.P.C. 29, aff'd, [2010] EWCA Civ 33, [2010] R.P.C. 29 (Eng.); Case C-428/08,
M~onsanto Tech. LLC v. Cetetra By, 2010 ECJ EUR{-Lex LEXIS 396 (EU).
33 See infra Part I.
34 See infra Part II.
35
Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
36Eli Lilly, [2008] EWHC (Pat) 1903.
3 d
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the patent application based on discord between the patentable DNA molecule's
disclosed function and its prescribed industrial application,38 the Justice also
signaled the emergence of newer patentability requirements. 39 On the other hand,
the European Court of Justice of the European Union ("ECJ") imposed new
limitations on DNA patentability by focusing on connectivity between invention and
its expected functionality. 40 In the case of Monsanto v. Cefetra,4 1 the Justice
Advocate General M. Palo-Mengozzi denied protection for the claimed nuclei
sequence type in enzyme gene, holding that such protection is limited to situations
where genetic information currently performs the function described in the patent. 42
Needless to say, courts' recognition of the ill-effects of gene patents' "abundance" in
all of these cases is indeed driven by the social need to put a leash on the unbridled
explosion of corporate monopoly through patenting.
Given the trend described thus far, do these decisions signal an apocalyptic end
of gene patents for agricultural and biotechnology companies? Could these judicial
decisions invite sweeping changes in the way these companies have engaged in rentseeking for their part in promoting innovation? The biotechnology companies have
already patented a large fraction of more than 25,000 genes identified under the
Human Genome Project ("HGP") 43-a
staggering one-fourth have already been
patented and about another one-fourth are at various stages in the patenting
process. 44 The stated functions of these genes range from developing new drugs, to
designing more efficient diagnostics, to researching for genetic predisposition to
disease, and to developing a prevention mechanism. 45 These include, among others,
a diagnostic test for risk assessment, gene therapy, an optimizing treatment protocol,
and cancer prevention. 46 Will the fall out of these decisions restrict the patentability
of life-saving drugs by reducing incentives for biotechnology companies? Or, will the
revised legal framework create a level playing field for research companies, while
providing patients with better access to life-saving drugs by enabling increased
participation? This article will examine in detail the broader impact of these three
decisions, while connecting a continuous trajectory of their origin in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.

38Id. 327.
39Id.
226.
40 Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 396,
(EU).
41

50

Id

Id.
62-63.
The Human Genome Project is a world-wide effort to sequence and map the genes of the
human body, which are made up of a staggering 100,000 genes, and the project is characterized as
one of the largest mapping efforts in the biological realm. See Elizabeth J. Thomson, Ethical, Legal
and Social Implications of the Human Genome Project, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 55, 55 (1994); G.
Kenneth Smith & Denise M. Kettelberger, Patents and the Human Genome Project, 22 AIPLA Q.J.
27, 30 (1994); George J. Annas, Mapping the Human Genome and the Meaning of Monster
Mythology, 39 EMoRY L.J. 629, 636 (1990).
44Alex Osterlind, Staking a Claim on the Building Blocks of Life: Human Genetic Material
Within the United States Patent System, 75 MO. L. REV. 617, 632 (2010).
45
1d4at617 _18.
46 Id.
42
43
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Thus, Part I of the article discusses how these three decisions contradict the
prior doctrinal trajectories of patent law while establishing connected threads of
commonalities among them.
Part II analyzes the broader impact of Myriad,
especially outlining how Myriad's expansive meaning is acquired through the lens of
Eli Lilly and Cefetra. Part III will engage in a discussion of the future paradigm
while diverging into several distinct threads, which will lead to the conclusion by
examining questions related to common heritage and distributive justice.

I. MYRIAD, CEFETRA AND HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES-BOUND BY A COMMON THREAD
In this Section, I seek to explore the evolving contour of gene patentability by
drawing the common lineage among the three opinions mentioned earlier. Instead of
analyzing them in isolation, I intend to examine the common roots that illuminate
the gene patentability paradigm embraced in these most recent decisions. An
individual foray will allow me to tease out their structural similarities, which I shall
use to examine their commonalities-through which the idea of an evolving legal
framework of gene patentability might acquire its meaning. Taken individually,
parts of each case may contradict isolated holdings in others. But taken as a whole,
these cases indeed complement the gene patent puzzle and contribute to a muchneeded, robust trajectory by informing us of the revised patentability framework.

A. European Court of Justice's Foray into Scope Reduction in Agricultural DNA Patent
Unveiled in 1998, in its directive on the legal protection of biotechnological
inventions ("Bio Directive"), the European Parliament presented a framework to
review patents for DNA sequencing in plants and animals. 47 Although intended to
provide common grounds in areas of protection for plant varieties, 48 these allowable
guidelines lost their meaning in the uncertain cacophony arising out of diverging
strands of patent mechanisms across Europe. A much needed flash point came in
2006, when a biotechnology dispute erupted between two companies. 49 The dispute
surfaced from the shipment of soy milk from Argentina to the EU.50 The soy milk in
question was obtained from GM soy and it was rendered tolerant to the glyphosate
herbicide. 51 This Roundup Ready ("RR") soy owed its existence to the presence of a
specific gene-encoding enzyme, 5-enol-pyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate
synthase
("EPSPS").52 Although there is no dispute that Monsanto had patented this RR soy,
other food crop manufacturing companies began to take advantage of the loose patent
4'7Council Directive 98/44/E, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 [hereinafter Bio Directive] (governing the
legal protection of biotechnological inventions and outlining a wide set of rules which limits any
legislation from going beyond the rules outlined therein, including those related to patents).
48 Id. at 13-14.
49 Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 396,
1532.
o0Id. 19.
51Id. 17.
52 Id.
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protection mechanism in Argentina, where this particular gene was not protected. 53
Armed with their ability to legally plant these seeds in Argentina without
Monsanto's permission, these companies began cultivating and exporting GM soy
meal to several European Union ("EU") countries for profit. 54
Monsanto's exclusive rights to European Patent EP 0 546 090 (issued June
1996) were based on claim by its researchers that have isolated two DNA molecules
that encode the EPSPS enzyme during 2005-2006.55 However, based on the lack of
patent protection in the cultivator country, several companies including the Cefetra
Group began importing consignments from Argentina. 56 Thus began Monsanto's
lawsuit against the importing countries for patent infringement in the Dutch District
Court of the Hague in 2006. The lawsuit trickled its way through a delayed process
of various stayed proceedings and cross-filings, eventually arriving at the ECJ, where
a set of questions were presented before the Court.5 7 These questions were intended
to explore the limits of protection for DNA sequences currently available under
Article 8 and 9 of the Bio Directive. 5 8 The ECJ's goal is to help in eventually arriving
at a decision that would provide a much-needed interpretive gloss over the Bio
Directive's applicability to patent protection for DNA sequencing. The following
questions form part of the questionnaire that was posed to the ECJ:
1. Should Article 9 of the Bio Directive be understood such that the
protection meant in this Article can also be relied upon in a situation
such as in these proceedings whereby the product (the DNA) is present
in a materials and does not express its function at the time of the stated
breach but has indeed expressed its function or possibly, following the
isolation from the material and its incorporation in the cell of an
organism, could once again express its function?
2. Does proceeding from the presence of the DNA sequence as described in
claim 6 of the patent in soy meal imported into the European
Community by Cefetra and ACTI and assuming that DNA is
incorporated in the soy meal as meant in Article 9 of the Bio Directive
and that it therein no longer expresses its function?
3. Does the provided protection of a patent for biological material in the Bio
Directive, specifically in Article 9, stand in the way for the national
patent legislationi to (additionally) allow absolute protection for the
product (the DNA) as such, whether or not the DNA expresses its
function and must the protection provided by Article 9 therefore be
considered exhaustive? 59

18.

53
T
54 Id.T T

Id.
56Id.
55

20-21.
15-17.
19.

571Id. 133-77.
See id.; Bio Directive, supra note 47, at 19.
se See Monsanto, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 396,
58

33-77.
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While delivering his opinion on behalf of the ECJ on March 9, 2010, the Justice
Advocate General M. Palo-Mengozzi provided the court's rational for the denial of
Monsanto's patent protection for the claimed DNA sequence. 60 The court reasoned
that the protection is limited to isolated genetic material that performs the function
described in the patent. 61 Therefore, for patent protection to be recognized, the
genetic material must perform the said function at the time of alleged infringement. 62
The court viewed the function of Monsanto's invention as the ability of the genetic
information to protect the biological material by conferring upon it herbicide
tolerance, without which the intended target could die. 63 However, the isolated genes
in the soy meal did not necessarily perform the designated function of protecting the
soy meal from the use of herbicide, as the genetic material could only be found in
residual state as "dead material" in the soy meal. 64 Thus, in the ECJ's analysis of the
protection provided for in Article 9 of the Bio Directive, the fundamental issue
revolved around whether isolated genes enjoy the same protection as the laboratorymanufactured, specialized genes. 65 The court found that the processed soy meal did
not contain functional genetic material and therefore, the protection was not
available to the GM seeds in the soy meal, as the genetic information had ceased to
perform the function in the processed material. 66
The patentability question here is based on arriving at the semantic distinction
between "biological materials" and "product." The court in Cefetra observed that the
DNA sequence can actively perform its function only in biological "living material"
but not in dead matter. 67 Drawing support in the legislative history of the Bio
Directive, the court discussed the difference between living material and the dead
matter, clarifying that dead matter does not replicate in the same way as living
matter. 68 Thus, the patentability determination relies on the necessary condition of
whether the DNA sequence is capable of performing the claimed function at the time
of infringement. The ability for the DNA sequence to perform such function in turn
depends on the threshold condition of whether the identified genetic material retains
its claimed functionality in the chemical compound, even where it only exists as a
residue in processed product.
In its opinion, the ECJ developed other strands of reasoning, relying in part on
the Bio Directive's superseding claim over domestic laws. 69 For the purpose of this
article, I shall refrain from examining that area of the decision, as I intend to restrict
this discussion on relevance to my main thesis of finding commonality of recent
patent decisions. This relevance reveals itself through the threshold questions
surrounding the patentability based on functionality, which draws attention to the
function-specific aspect of this new development in European patent law. The
60 Id.
61 Id.

50.

Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
62

65 Id.
66 Id.

67 Id.

68Id

6.
48-50.

69 Id. 78.
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patentability under this function-specific, de minimis framework 70 unfolds in two
threads: (i) if or when the DNA is performing a function, must the DNA be actively
expressed at the time of infringement and (ii) is performing its function
fundamentally indistinguishable in instances where the protection from the DNA
sequence is absolute or omnipotent? Thus, we must answer the threshold question of
whether the claimed DNA sequence is so narrowly tailored or function-specific that it
is restricted to a specific function provided in the patent.
Indeed, the Cefetra decision by the ECJ will acquire expansive meaning over
time, especially when seen through the lens of other contemporary opinions in patent
protection cases. Taken in isolation, the ECJ decision restricts the scope and
admissibility of patent application on fundamental difference between biologically
active and biologically inert material.7 1 This binding opinion virtually forecloses EUbased, large biotechnology companies like Monsanto from isolating specific DNA
sequences, altering their information content, and claiming exclusive rights. Mere
isolation of DNA for the purpose of injecting them with human intelligence,
therefore, would no longer grant companies absolute protection, as this newly devised
threshold condition appears to be a difficult legal hurdle to overcome.
The ECJ promulgated framework, therefore, holds that if a DNA sequence
cannot be proven to have performed the exact function as described in the patent
application at the time of alleged infringement, the claimed patent loses its
protection. This minimalistic approach in patentability will allow other companies to
be part of the broader food chain by being able to compete meaningfully without
specter of lawsuits. As a result, a newer economic reality will ensue-which, in the
absence of a monopolistic paradigm, would evolve to be a more prudent doctrinal
development in patent law in the long run.

B. The U.K. Court's Foray into Probing the
Academic Confines of Patent Disclosure
In a case that had begun to unfold two years prior to the ground-breaking ruling
in the Monsanto case, Eli Lilly v. Human Genome ScienceS72 brought forward a legal
dispute challenging the validity of Human Genome Sciences' ("HGS") European
Patent EP0939804, where HGS patented a newly discovered protein called
Neutrokine-alpha. 73 HGS appealed Justice Kitchin's decision invalidating the HGS
patent, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in February 201074-around the same time
as when the ECJ affirmed the Monsanto case. In El Lilly, the threshold question of
70Id.
39-40 (describing the "extremely small quantities" that may be present in the alleged
infringing material).
71Id. 48 ("As follows from paragraph 37 of this judgment, a DNA sequence such as that at
issue in the main proceedings is not able to perform its function when it is incorporated in a dead
material such as soy meal.").
72 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Human Genome Sciences, [2008] EWHC (Pat) 1903, [2008] R.P.C. 29, aff'd,
[2010] EWCA Civ 33, [2010] R.P.C. 14 (Eng.).

74 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Human Genome Sciences, [2010] EWCA Civ 33, [2010] R.P.C. 14
(Eng.).
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patent validity was whether the patent claim described an invention that follows the
patentability requirement of "susceptible of industrial application."75 Under U.K.
law, an invention is considered to be susceptible of industrial application if and only
if it can be made or used in some kind of industry. 76 The Court determined the
question of gene-patent validity by devising a two part test. Thus, a gene sequence is
patentable if: (i) the applicant discloses the industrial application of the protein for
which it encodes; and (ii) the applicant discovers the gene sequence. 77
Under this framework, therefore, an invention is not patentable if the applicant
does not disclose how the invention is to be used. The background leading to the Eli
Lilly case evolved in the following way: HGS had discovered the protein in question
using bioinformatics and had duly filed a patent application well before the
biotechnology researchers were able to perform traditional laboratory studies on the
constituent gene that encodes the protein.
Although subsequent laboratory
analysis were able to synchronize the functionality of the claimed protein with
functionalities similar to tumor necrosis factor and related Cytokines, 79 this
functionality had not been identified a priori at the time of the patent application.
The argument against patentability, therefore, is primarily based on factual
observation that, although identified functionality could be tied to the isolated
protein, such functionality became identifiable after the DNA sequence was invented
and patented.8 0 The court observed that claimed functionality could not be tied to the
claimed DNA without actually identifying the intended functionality of the claimed
DNA, and therefore, the claimed DNA's intended use must be declared beforehand.
Although the patent application provided sufficient information to envision the
plausibility that Neutrokine-alpha 81 could be a member of TNF ligand super family, 82
such information, provided without a deterministic framework, could not be sufficient
to theorize the usage for the identified protein. Therefore, a fuzzy postulation of a
plausible theoretical usage is not enough to confer exclusive patent protection to an
invention of a biologic material. During the proceedings, the plaintiff observed that
in the world of biotechnological inventions, the biological effects and activities of
chemical compounds-especially the broader conglomeration of super family-were
so poorly understood that attaching any usage for a recently invented protein was
merely a speculative journey, rather than a definite trajectory from invention to
usage. 83 The Appellate Court concurred with this observation by Justice Kitchin:
Neither the patent nor the common general knowledge identified any
disease or condition which Neutrokine-a could be used to diagnose or treat.
Id. T 51.
76Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255. To
7

explain from a U.S. perspective, this patentability requirement is akin to the utility requirement
under U.S. patent law. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (requiring "new and useful" for patentability).
77 Eli Lilly, [2010] R.P.C. 14, 55, 64.
78Id. 1 5 (discussing Eli Lilly, [2008] R.P.C. 29, 11 1, 7-9).
TB
Id.
133-35.
80 Id.
81 Id.

Id.
83 Id.

145-47, 149, 153-54.

82

120.
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Its functions were, at best, a matter of expectation and then at far too high
a level of generality to constitute a sound or concrete basis for anything
except a research project. 84
While agreeing with the Chancery Court's findings of patent invalidation on lack
of sufficiency of information at the patent disclosure stage, the Appellate Court
further observed that the application disclosure fell short of providing the necessary
description of an "immediate and concrete benefit." 85
Clearly, this requirement of a more definitive connection between patentable
material and its prescribed usage signals a narrowing of the prospective field of
patents by the U.K. courts in the upcoming days. Patentable invention of DNA
sequence must, therefore, clearly delineate and identify possible use, the absence of
which would invite more denials than ever before. This would preclude inventors
from rushing to claim protection for every DNA sequence they are able to isolate.
Therefore, the U.K. court's decision has structural coherence with the Cefetra
decision, as resonates within its finding is the ECJ's invalidation of Monsanto's claim
on absence of linkage between the invention with its intended functionality. We,
therefore acquire a deeper appreciation for the patentability framework in
recognizing the rational of the European courts' restricting foray into gene patenting.
This will allow eventual pruning of the field from an explosive abundance of patent
claims, which in turn, will allow other companies to share the results of their
research in molecular genetics.
Therefore, the court straddles a minimalistic
approach in crafting a restrictive approach in connecting definitive trajectory from
invention to specific usage, a framework I compare next as I examine Judge Sweet's
decision in Myriad.

C. Myriad-A Preview
On March 29, 2010, three weeks after the ECJ decision, Judge Sweet of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a summary judgment to
Myriad, by holding that fifteen claims of seven different patents (claims-in-suit) were
invalid due to non-patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.86 In invalidating
the patent claim of Myriad, the exclusive licensor of the patent-in-suit, the district
court identified two different classes. 87 The first class consisted of composition claims
directed towards isolated DNA coding for the BRCA1, BRCA2 genes. 88 The second
class comprised of method claims, directed towards identifying specific mutations in
the BRCA genes, by analyzing and comparing the sequencing obtained from human
samples. 89 Judge Sweet held the classes of claims invalid as belonging to nonpatentable subject matter, while devising two different tests of patentability under

84 Id. T 118 (discussing Eli Lilly, [2008] R.P.C. 29, T 234).
85 Id.
146 (discussing Eli Lilly, [2008] R.P.C. 29, 234).

86Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 232-33, 236-38.

87Id.

at 185.

88Id. at 217.
89Id. at 233.
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section U.S.C. § 101.90 These include the analysis of the "machine or transformation"
test devised earlier, which was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court in Bilski
v. Kappos.91 The threshold questions proposed by Judge Sweet are as follows:
i.

Did the composition claim cover subject matter that had markedly
different properties from composition found in nature?

ii.

Did the method claims satisfy the "machine or transformation test"
in that, the claim process is tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or it transforms a particular article into a different state
or thing? 92

In invalidating these claims, Judge Sweet broke new ground in various ways.
First, he asserted that long-standing practice of giving judicial deference to USPTO
policy in determining patentability is no longer viable. 93 The Judge did not bring in
arguments of constitutionality in the contextual analysis of his decision-making
process, although noting in passing that the unconstitutionality of the takings
argument is unsupported by legal precedent. 94 Indeed, we cannot escape noticing the
dichotomous threads in this decision, as the Judge treads in some uncertainty. This
is revealed in the Judge's rejection of judicial deference to USPTO polices, while
relying on precedents in invalidating constitutional claims.
However, the
significance of this decision comes not from any individual statutory strand adopted
by the Judge, but from the trajectory of his entire enquiry that will illuminate the
revised framework of patentability in unveiling as a newer patentability paradigm.

90

Id. at 232-33, 236-38.

91Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225-27, 3229-31 (2010).

Bilski was billed to be the
definitive case to test the limit of the machine or transformation framework of determining whether
certain methods are patentable subject matter. Unfortunately, however, Bilski failed to live up to
that reputation. The Supreme Court decided Bilski on very narrow grounds. Id. The Court
unanimously rejected Bilski's business method claim as unpatentably abstract, addressing the
patentability of process patent claim under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 3230. While Bilski's core holding
will have little impact on patent holders, the Court left open the possibility to reshape the patent
statute by forbidding patenting of certain classes of business methods. Id. at 3231. Straddling the
same development lines of the last several decades, the Court's guidance remained both shallow and
somewhat unambiguous while considerable uncertainty will continue to influence the patentability
of business methods as the Court rejected the Federal Circuit's sole reliance on machine or
transformation tests. Id. Thus, rather than providing new guidance on testing the patentability on
process claims, the Court, invoking earlier precedents held claims directed toward laws of nature,
physical phenomena, or abstract ideas are unpatentable. Id. at 3230.
92Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 227-28, 233.
93 Id. at 221.
94 Id. at 221-22.
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D. Anatomy of the Myriad RulingIts Connectivuty with the European Opinions
In invalidating Myriad's claim, the court based its decision on patentability of
the isolated DNA by noting that these DNA did not have markedly different
properties from its native counterpart DNA. 95 The court arrived at the conclusion by
adopting a fundamental-based approach to highlight inherent features of DNA, in
that the isolated DNA sequence does not alter the fundamental property of DNA
from the version that resides in the body.96 This is an unexpected departure from the
course long held by U.S. courts. 97 By not focusing on the chemical composition of
DNA, the Judge shifted his attention to an information content paradigm. In
asserting that isolated and purified DNA's chemical differences from their natural
precursors are not sufficient enough, in and of itself, to grant an isolated DNA patent
protection, the Judge explained how Myriad differs in applicability from the bedrock
constitutional case of Chakrabarty.98 Although Chakrabarty revolutionized the
patent doctrine-where a genetically engineered bacteria, with the ability to break
down components of crude oil was determined to have "markedly different
characteristics" than anything found in nature-Judge Sweet maintained that the
Myriad case did not involve such "markedly different characteristics" based on
chemical differences between isolated and naturally occurring DNA. 99
While bringing a more fundamental function-driven analysis of DNA sequencing
by focusing on DNA's unique qualities as the physical embodiment of information,
the Judge concluded that, difference in chemical composition renders no significant
distinguishability between the native BRCA and the isolated BRCA, in that they do
not possess both a structural and functional difference. 100 In prior practices, the
court granted a patent if the DNA is isolated, whereas district courts premised its
findings on the observation that isolated DNA should be treated no different than
naturally occurring DNA. Therefore, the decision came down to embracing and
relying on a significantly different framework than the previous one.
In addressing Myriad's purification argument, the court determined the
question of whether the purification of naturally occurring compound provides them
the protection of patentability. The court did this by observing that purification, in
and of itself, without having a more fundamental transformation, does not render a
compound patentable. 101 By going through the doctrinal development in patent law,
the court cited a panoply of past Supreme Court and lower court opinions, 102 while
carefully dissecting and addressing Myriad's arguments based on precedents. On the
grounds of novelty under § 102, the court held ground on the patentable subject
95 Id. at 232.
96 Id.

at 185.

97 See David J. Kappos, Building Bridges and Making Connections Across the IP System, 20
FED. CIR. B.J. 273, 278 (2010) (discussing the unexpected and potential far-reaching impact of the
Myriad decision).
98See Myriad at 223-24.
9 Id. at 223, 232.
100 Id. at 229.
101Id. at 223.
102Id. at 221-28.
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matter framework of § 101.103
It observed that products of nature constitute
patentable subject matter only by introducing changes in that product which
invariably result in a fundamentally new product. 104 Therefore, merely by being
isolated and purified and by being different in a DNA sequence of a chromosome, this
does not guarantee characteristics of "markedly different" in a compound. Without
this guarantee, the compound is not patentable.
Although the Myriad case has been appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit and might eventually end up in the Supreme Court, the striking
similarities between the three cases described above-all decided within a span of
thirty days in three markedly different jurisdictions-perhaps points to a more
fundamental thread emerging in patent law. U.K. law restricts patentability of
protein sequences on the disclosure doctrine.1 05 Under this principle, the disclosure
must be both plausible and precise as it relates to how the gene sequence should be
used and what immediate and concrete benefits can be expected from its function. 106
Recall that the ECJ restricted the patentability of biotechnological DNA used in
agriculture on grounds that at the time of alleged infringement, the DNA must
function in the same way as when it was invented.107 Resonating within Judge
Sweet's Myriad decision, I see the contour of a similar function-specificity
requirement and a similar disclosure focus. A focus on function as information
carrier is the common thread that resonates in all three cases, the impact and
broader consequences of which, I shall discuss next.

II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF MYRIAD AND
WHAT IT MEANS FOR PATENTABILITY

In Myriad, the district court reduced the scope of patentability by stepping back
from the existing legal framework. The district court achieved this revision by
following a two-step process. In the first, the district court applied the "markedly
different characteristic" test from Chakrabarty to observe that isolated and purified
genes do not differ significantly from the native DNA. 108 In so doing, the district
court reduced the strength of "therapeutic and commercial value" argument of earlier
framework.109 In the second, the district court categorized DNA as information and
not as a chemical compound, while concluding that isolated and purified DNA is
indistinguishable from the native DNA and thus, does not become patentable subject
matter. 110 Despite becoming a subject of criticism for venturing into unchartered
103Id. at 226.
104 Id. at 223.
105Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255; see Eli Lilly

& Co. v. Human Genome Sciences, [2010] EWCA Civ 33, [2010] R.P.C. 14 (Eng.),
149-54.
106 Eli Lilly, [2010] R.P.C. 14,
149-54.
'o? Case C-428/08, M~onsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra By, 2010 ECJ EUR{-Lex LEXIS 396, TV 4849; see discussion supra Part I.A.
108Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 226-27, 232 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980)).
109 Id. at 226.
110 Id. at 228.
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territory of revising the formula for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101 patentable
subject matter, the decision is to be appreciated for informing us of its structural
similarity with ECJ's opinion in Monsanto and the U.K. Chancery Court's opinion in
Eli Lilly. As I have shown in Section I, Myriad acquires an expansive meaning when
placed alongside these European cases. Having examined the connectivity among
the three cases, I seek to analyze Judge Sweet's reduction in the scope of DNA
patentability through the twin lens of, (i) distinction from Chakrabarty's "markedly
different characteristic" test, and (ii) primacy of information content argument over
chemical composition characteristics.

A. Stepping Away from the Novelty Argument
In Myriad, the district court narrowed the scope of the novelty and nonobviousness argument by citing several precedential cases to establish that novelty
and non-obviousness considerations are not necessary in determining patentable
subject matter.111 Observing that novelty and non-obvious considerations are
separate requirements, the court felt these requirements are ancillary to the
threshold determination of whether the invention contains "markedly different
characteristics" over products existing in nature. 112 Because these characteristics
neither hold primary force nor stand alone in their deterministic objective, their
patentability requirement value attenuated in this revised framework. 113
By
reducing the force of commercial and therapeutic properties of the invention in
determining patentability, the court further established that the novelty argument
can no longer stand alone. 114
To achieve its intended goal of scope reduction, the district court reminded us of
the factual surroundings in the Supreme Court's rejection of patents on claims of
commercially useful natural products in American Fruit Growers,115 Funk
Brothers,116 American Wood-Paper,117 and O'Reilly. 118 In each of these cases, the
Supreme Court has shown that the novelty and non-obviousness characteristics have
lesser value in defining patentable subject matter than the utility requirement
framed in § 101 and thus, the cases provide illustrations of non-patentable subject
matter. Embracing these precedential cases, in a clever construction of patentability,
the district court also managed to deconstruct Myriad's framework premised upon
Park-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 1 19 which found isolated and purified DNA
patent-eligible on being separate in characteristics from those naturally occurring.
Here the district court takes great care in crafting its reasoning around the "prior

111Id. at 225-27.
112Id. at 226.
113Id.
114 Id.

115
Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931).

116Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
117
Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fiber Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566 (1874).
118 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
119 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
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art" argument. 120 The "prior art" argument relies on a combination of "commercial
and therapeutic properties of the invention" test, which eliminates the requirement
of "markedly different characteristic" requirement in establishing patentability. 121
Before Myriad, the courts and the USPTO could consider the validity of a patent
if the invention contained some of the desired therapeutic properties, even if lacking
markedly different distinguishable characteristics. 122 In the pre-Myriad framework,
therefore, in a competition between the "markedly different characteristics" and the
therapeutic properties, the latter could win if the former is conspicuous by its
absence in the invention. Indeed, the Myriad court narrowed the older paradigm's
expansive limits as it observed the framework to be unnecessarily encompassing,
while being vaguely amenable to all kinds of claims. 123 Myriad thus prompts us to
follow a two-step process in its § 101 requirement analysis. In the first, we must
determine if the claimed invention satisfies the utility requirement. In the second,
we must determine if the claimed invention contains statutory subject matter in
identifying whether it is a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,"
or any new or useful improvement thereof. Here, the utility determination resides on
analyzing utility of invention, not for a commercial and therapeutic value, but for
invention containing distinguishable characteristic as outlined in Chakrabarty's
"markedly different characteristic from any found in nature, and one having the
potential for significant utility." 124
The threshold question, therefore, is whether isolation or purification of the gene
is a necessary step in order to utilize the diagnostic utility of the gene mutation and
whether this diagnostic aspect in of itself constitutes a markedly different
characteristic. 125 The court distinguished Chakrabarty's patentable subject matter
characteristic test under § 101 in observing that simply extracting a product of
nature for improved therapeutic use does not assign the characteristics of "markedly
different" upon the invention. 126 This revised application of the "markedly different
characteristics" standard seems to have the potential to invalidate patentability of all
purified products, which may have more commercial and therapeutic value then the
utility that is sought under the new paradigm. In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court
qualified the "markedly different characteristics" standard:
In choosing such expansive terms as "manufacture" and "composition of
matter," modified by the comprehensive "any," Congress plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope. . . .127

120Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 225-26.
121

Id

122See Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103 (considering therapeutic properties in determining a patent's

validity).
123MVyriad, 702 F . Supp. 2d at 226 (stating the old standard is no longer good law because it
does not require patent to have markedly different characteristics over products existing in nature).
124 See id. at 228.
125 See id. at 227.
126 See id. at 229.
127See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
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In declining to apply Chakrabarty, the district court rejected this expansive
argument by narrowing the subject matter requirement into a more restrictive subset
of characteristics that must satisfy the requirements of § 101.128

B. Information Carrier versus Chemical CompoundsIsolated versus Natural DNA
In categorizing DNA as information and not as a chemical compound, the
district court stripped the isolated and purified DNA's special patentability status
and emphasized that the isolated and purified version is not distinct from the native
version.
Judge Sweet's focus on DNA's unique status as the "the physical
embodiment of information" 129 is based on an understanding that information stored
and transmitted in DNA remains unchanged whether for naturally occurring DNA or
for isolated and purified DNA. In this carrier of physical information argument,
DNA, while both serving the purpose of defining human body and acting as the
physical expression of laws of nature, remains indistinguishable in both forms being
contested here. 130 Therefore, an isolated and purified DNA functions as the encoder
for proteins to define physical traits, functioning as that of naturally occurring
DNA-which leads to the observation that simply isolating and purifying DNA does
not render the invention (patented gene) a "markedly different characteristic."
Indeed, while chemicals perform some biological functions within the body, such
as conveying information content from a source to a destination, they do so as part of
revealing their molecular structure and for the biological expression of their own
chemical identity. In this sense, DNA separates itself fundamentally from the
chemical compound in that it directs the synthesis of other molecules while encoding
the characteristics of other chemical compounds, biological processes, and physical
properties within the biologic framework. 131 Therefore, even if an isolated and
purified DNA has a structure where the DNA contains only the coding sequence, in
which the accompanying intron sequence is spliced out, the resulting purification
cannot be considered a structural metamorphosis, but is a change emerged as a
result of RNA splicing-a natural phenomenon. 132 In addition, the court reasoned
that the physical coding sequences of cDNA are the same as those of spliced mature
mRNA, such that a cDNA is the carrier of DNA, where as mRNA, the messenger
RNA is derived from the DNA by splitting out the intron sequence. 133 This biological
basis of distinction between isolated, purified DNA and naturally occurring DNA
acquires meaning from its functional property, which validates the court's conclusion
of not having "markedly different characteristics." 1 34
128Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
129Id. at 229.
130See id. at 185, 194 (recognizing that DNA represents the physical embodiment of biological
information and is traditionally seen as an embodiment of laws of nature-like heredity).
131Id. at 228 (explaining that "it would be erroneous to view DNA as 'no different[ ]' than other
chemicals previously the subject of patents").
132Id. at 230.
133 See id.
134 See id.
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Clearly the court embarked on a new journey-a journey that focused on the
functionality of the compound itself, restricting the class of purified products that can
be made patentable. This also calls into question the validity of some of the older
cases, where purified adrenaline, vitamin B12, and other life saving drugs have been
deemed patentable subject matter based not on their chemical functions but on their
non-obviousness and therapeutic characteristics. 135 So, collapsing this distinction
between pure and isolated form and naturally occurring form is a new framework-a
framework based on the understanding that DNA contains the functional property of
an information carrier, whether
isolated or native.
Could this patentability
framework, so ordained, withstand appellate review? This is an area I explore next
as I trace the shared contours of Myriad and its European cousins.

C. Dissecting the Framework of Shared Connectivuty
Myriad presents a new patentability argument under § 101, where the
"markedly different characteristics" argument gets primacy over the novelty and nonobviousness argument. This paradigm shift ordained by the district court acquires a
superior interpretative gloss if further dissected through the threshold questions
presented in Cefetra and El Lilly, as I have shown before. 136 The patentability of the
gene sequence in Cefetra was determined based on finding direct connection between
the invention and the function it was designed for. 137 In Eli Lilly, the threshold
question was whether the patentable sequence should disclose its function and
whether this function has concrete and immediate benefit. 138 Tracing the path taken
by Judge Sweet in Myriad, the patentability was determined based on whether the
claimed invention is fundamentally different while arguing that the subject matter of
invention must be seen as an information carrier-performing a function, as opposed
to being only a chemical composition-thus, not connecting it with functionality as
such. 139 This function versus composition argument finds resonance in the European
cases as well, where the patent eligibility is tied to prescribed functionality. 140 Their
similarity signals a trend in judiciary towards restricting the scope of patentability
for DNA sequences.
These judicial invalidations should be seen as a broader
indication of the emergence of a new, minimalistic patent paradigm. The scope
restriction in these decisions must be seen as judiciary's attempt to introduce
functional efficiency in patentability doctrine. Therefore, let us step back and try to
understand this emergent patentability argument from its structural suitability.
Policy initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic, reveal policymakers' recognition
that the law must synchronize with technology's advancement. This is especially
true, given the explosion of patents in the last three decades under an overtly

135E.g., Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958); ParkeDavis & Co. v. H.1K. M~ulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
136See discussion supra Part I.D.
137See discussion supra Part I.A.
138See discussion supra Part I.B.
139See discussion supra Part I.C.
140See discussion supra Part I.D.

[10:5082011]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

528

inclusive DNA patent paradigm. 141 The USPTO introduced a new set of guidelines in
2001 for assessing the utility of patents, as a partial response to the concerns over
granting excessive biotechnology patents. 142
One of the USPTO's announced
objectives is to develop a, "specific, substantive, and credible utility test" to prevent
granting patents that protect a specific DNA sequence in cases where the function of
the sequence or the associated protein is unknown. 143 The European Biotech
Directive in 1998 was designed with a similar objective in view, which required the
identification of an industrial application of a sequence claimed in a patent
application.144

Therefore, the judiciary's scope reduction is not isolated legal maneuvering.
Rather, it is a continuation of the regulatory development that started near the end
of last century in an effort to shrink the available universe of patentable genes.
Technology's advancement has allowed biotechnology companies to engage in
excessive experimentation of random isolation and purification of human DNA and
protein sequence, either by data mining or by using computer algorithms, to generate
random fragments of sequences. Using superior technology to eventually match
these sequences, in some instances by displaying homological similarities to
previously characterized genes, and in some instances simply by speculating on
functions, the companies also began claiming patent protection at an excessive
frequency. This prompted regulatory bodies on both sides of the Atlantic to reign in
the process of patenting-albeit, via scope reduction of patentable DNA sequences.
Comprehending the process, which the biotechnology companies use to generate
excessive amount of patentable DNA, can illuminate us in recognizing the urgency
for scope reduction. The identification of genes with specific functionality is mostly
done by high-speed computer algorithms using highly sophisticated statistical
analysis in a remarkably different approach to the traditional "wet lab" approach. 145
Their dissimilarity lies in the fact that activity of the genes, connecting a specific
141See Chester S. Chuang & Denys T. Lau, Case ProhibitingPatents on Human Genes Ignites
Debate, RECORDER (S.F.), Dec. 20, 2010, at 9 ("It is estimated that about 20 percent of human genes
are associated with at least one U.S. patent and that the number of DNA-related patents exceeds
40,000.").
142 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092-93 (Jan. 5, 2001) (adopting
new guidelines and responding to specific comments submitted in response to proposed guidelines
affecting gene patentability).
143 Id
144 See Bio Directive, supra note 47, 22 (requiring disclosure of the industrial application in
the patent application).
145 A bioinformatics approach differs from traditional "wet lab" approach in that material is not
analyzed through a classical means of analysis using chemical solvents, specialized apparatus, and
in a process that involves various intermediate steps, such as distillation, ventilation, etc. See Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Human Genome Sciences, [2010] EWCA Civ 33, [2010] R.P.C. 29 (Eng.),
42-43
(explaining the complicated techniques of "wet lab" experiments were what litigation was focused on
before bioinformatics existed). The results of wet lab experiments are not based on random events,
rather results are obtained via chemical analysis of compounds. Id. On the other hand, in
bioinformatics, experiments are performed based on computer algorithms, in which identification
and prediction of compounds are done via statistical matching of large number of compounds in a
computationally intensive process. Id.
44. Thus, the activity of a gene identified using
bioinformatics could be statistically predicted based on the activities of the members of the family of
genes-not based on an actual chemical composition-driven analysis. Id. 48.
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DNA sequence to functionality, is predicted not based on fundamental based
scientific methods. 146 Rather, this identification with the activities of the members of
a broader family of genes is done via bioinformatics approach. 147 In this scenario, an
actual identification of the DNA's function does not become apparent until the DNA
has been cloned outside its natural environment and its protein encoded. 148
Therefore, when this particular DNA sequencing mechanism is claimed for the
patent application, oftentimes it is done based on random speculation with the
aspiration that computer-based procedure will ultimately obtain the required
connectivity.
Thus, the assignment of claimed invention to its intended use
sometimes is done not in a priori basis, but rather on an ex post facto basis. In the
current context of Myriad, the patentability of the transformation that is brought
before the judicial determination, falls within this category of bioinformatics-driven,
random matching algorithm, which is more of a data manipulation and
transformation then a "markedly differently transformation."
In a similar vein, the El Lilly court at Chancery rejected HGS's argument that
the patent was not novel, was obvious, and was not useful. Basing its determination
on the Article 57 of the European Patent Convention ("EPC"), 149 the U.K. court noted
that on the basis of its structural properties, the claim may have been correctly
identified as belonging to a member with known functionalities. 150 The connection
between invention and its intended usage, however, suffers from fatal flaws and
thus, not patentable. Because, the court argued, those members of one protein class
may share well-characterized and clearly-understood functions, but the members of
other protein class may display different effects, where no single effect can be
assigned to the new member without relying on some experimental data. 15 1
Similarly, the ECJ rejected Monsanto's contention that its patented DNA loses
exclusivity to the claimed invention if it cannot be conclusively proven that the
claimed function is performed in instances of alleged infringement. 152 Because, the
court observed, the alleged invention at the time in question may have lost its
functionality, it can no longer be cloaked under the exclusive protection of a claimed
patent.

146See id. 49 (explaining that using bioinformatics is akin to a very well-educated and
planned guess).
147Id. 48.
148 Id
149COnVention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255. The
European Patent Convention is a multilateral treaty, which provides a legal framework in which
European patents are awarded. Id.
150 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Human Genome Sciences, [2010] EWCA Civ 33, [2010] R.P.C. 29 (Eng.)
51, 139 (emphasizing the inquiry of whether correctly identifying the gene's connection to the
member family of genes is enough to satisfy the functionality requirement).
151Id.
145-46 (explaining that "plausible" functionality is not sufficient for patentability).
152Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 396, 40.

[10:5082011]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

530

III. GOING BEYOND MYRIAD-EXAMINATION OF BROADER TRENDS
So, what is next in this evolving saga of dispute over patentability of human
gene or isolated DNA sequences? Discussion thus far informs us that the judiciary
may have finally caught up with the law's inability to catch up with biotechnology's
leap. First, it was the European courts' restricting the scope of DNA patents by
articulating a new paradigm that connects patentability with functionality. 153 Then,
it was the U.S. district court revising the patentability requirement by adopting
better semantics and restricted focus. 154 Based on the history of gene patents' longstanding dispute over doctrinal difficulties, several questions come naturally before
us. Can we elicit a deeper meaning from the new direction being charted for the
patentability of human biological framework? What do these decisions teach us visa-vis the profound issues of human heritage and its relationship with its genome?
Where does this newer legal framework fall in relation to perennial conflict between
the maximalist and minimalist positions? I intend to address these important
questions in the following discussion.

A. Shaping Patentability Under the Common
Heritage of Mankind Principle
Patentability doctrines have evolved through the quintessential tension between
the two frameworks: one predicated on the idea of state supervision and the other
premised on corporate ownership of natural resources based on monopoly rent.
Patent discussions have largely ignored the viability of the patrimony of the heritage
of all citizens in making judicial decision with respect to the ownership of human
genes. 155 The arguments have been conceived, described, and determined along a
vacillating thread that begins with the idea of not challenging the ownership, 156 and
then moves to the concept of granting of rights under a source doctrine. 15 7 Given the
narratives of individual human suffering prompted by delayed medical care, which is
now unfolding in the background of the Myriad case, 15 8 it is high time to take
retrospective inquest at searching for patent law's legal lineage under mankind's
common heritage. More than 150 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the
abstract fundamentals of human invention by tracing its roots shared by all
humanity. 159 One court characterized it by noting:

153See discussion supra Part L.A-B.
154See discussion supra Part C.
155 See Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (describing several amici curiae's contentions that
human genes should be part of the public trust doctrine and patenting human genes runs contrary
to that doctrine).
156See id. at 193.
157 See id. at 190.
158 See id. (summarizing the view of several amici who argued that Myriad's gene patent
deprives women access to needed medical testing).
159Leroy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
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This declaration informs us of humanity's inherent desire in sharing the fruits of
human invention sourced from their common biological structure, thus revealing that
every human has a shared interest in whom and by what means it is manipulated.
Premised behind this observation is the fundamental dogma of human civilization
that every human is connected with his or her forefathers, descendents, and siblings.
Therefore, a gene sequence extracted at any given time from any individual human
for the purpose of genetic testing, directly or indirectly, connects all humanity. When
a DNA sequence from a specific individual, either belonging to a particular ethnic
group or from a specific geographical region, is extracted for the purpose of biologic
testing, parts of that extracted DNA are shared by humans across ethnic frontiers
and across geographical boundaries. Thus, the results of a manipulation performed
on an isolated biological extract impact both in future evolution and in welfare of all
humans-a sublime recognition that resonates with the broader meaning of Myriad,
that there is no fundamental difference in DNA, in whatever state it is brought for
testing.
Myriad's fundamental holding-espousing a scope reduction for DNA
testing-acquires further illumination in understanding the connectivity of DNA
among all humans 161 in the sense that sequencing DNA is akin to an extract of the
broader and more expansive human genome.
The above sentiments get additional primacy as seen in the echo of the United
Nations Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, observing that
human genomes are part of a common heritage. 162 Similarly, both the Council of
Europe and the International Human Genome Organisation ("HUGO") have observed
that data manipulation, experimentation, and scientific discovery of any part of
human genome extract must be understood in the broader light of commonality of
human heritage. 163 Rights and legal framework must reflect these commonalities.
The U.S. Supreme Court, almost a century after its proclamation in Leroy v.
Tatham1 64 has observed in Funk Brothers, "They are manifestation of law of nature is

160

In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing Leroy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. at 175).

161Myriad, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 228-29 (explaining that DNA is the physical embodiment of

information and because its nucleotide sequence is important to both the natural biological function
and the utility of DNA in its isolated form, it is an unpatentable product of nature).
162E.S.C. Res. 29/16
(Nov. 11, 1997), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001102/
110220e.pdf~page=47; see generally Pilar N. Ossorio, The Human Genome as Common Heritage:
Common Sense or Legal Nonsene?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425 (2007) (considering the common
heritage of DNA under property principles).
163See Eur. Consult. Ass., Protection of the Human GJenome by the Council of Europe, 107th
Sess., Doc. No. 9002 (2001), http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc01/
edoc9002.htm; Statement, Human Genome Org., Intellectual Prop. Comm., Statement on the Scope
of Gene Patents Research Exemption, & Licensing of Patented Gene Sequences for Diagnostics (Dec.
2003), http://www.hugo-international.org/img/ip gene_2003.pdf.
16455 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1872).
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free to all men reserved exclusively to none." 1 65 Patentability of human genes should,
therefore, not be based on corporate interests, nor should it be based on
governmental understanding of hierarchical rights. Because such deterministic
principles of patentability creates exclusivity, a right that confers economic incentive
on a limited few, these principles deprive the majority from the fruits of labor that
must be shared by all.
Therefore, the common heritage of mankind principle is poised to acquire
further meaning within our contemporary discussions on patentability, albeit not in
splendid isolation of exclusion of other competing doctrines premised on either
economic exclusivity or rights. The series of judicial opinions that have illuminated
our most recent understanding of law's applicability surrounding patentability of
DNA sequences may have attempted to arrive at that understanding of the common
heritage of mankind principle. Although courts have not explicitly articulated such
an argument, perhaps there is an underpinning of that awareness.

B. Property Rights Discussions of Patentability
As we transition from the discussion of humanity's shared interests, our
collective construct begins to become illuminated by an awareness of a communal
property mindset. However, to essentialize this concept of property under public
domain will mean conferring presumptive liberty rights to appropriate information
related to existing art. Corporations and industry trade associations have been
immensely successful in pushing their super-maximalist agenda through the public
domain while subverting public interest and sending important patent policy
problems into oblivion. 166 Debates occurred over whether patent rights doctrine
should be fundamentally based on the government's eminent domain power under
the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 167 Eminent domain empowers the
government to alter, supervise, and influence patent policy issues to ensure that
protectionist regimes are not depriving the common majority who are not in a
position to ask "whose rights are they anyway?" 168

165Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).

166See generally Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) (expressing
apprehension that public domain is increasingly being used for subverting the public's vital interest
against in contradiction to Constitutional grants); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE 59 (2000) (arguing that a corporation's broader power in developing technology for the
public's use is essentially privatizing public domain); Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (describing how socially optimal use of resources have
been impeded by over-extension of property rights granted to private entities).
167 See Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Property: The Historical Protection of Patents
Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 693-96 (2007) (discussing privatizing patents). The
last clause of the Fifth Amendment is called the Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and refers
to the government ability to recapture property through its power of eminent domain. This clause
restricts the power of eminent domain by requiring that a fair or "just compensation" be paid if
private property is taken for public use. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
168 Mossoff, supra note 167, at 693-96.
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The Takings Clause allows government to take over private property under
situational exigencies where government intervention is warranted to ensure the
greatest welfare for the majority of the people. 169 The problem is that embracing the
concept would mean conceding the argument that patent is a property right that can
be privatized. 170 Consider the following scenario: A corporation extracts biological
physical material from a human individual, while recognizing that, any isolated
human biological material is shared across the broader human genetic pool. Can the
knowledge of that sequence be kept exclusive under the category of private property?
On the other hand, empowering the government to take property under eminent
domain virtually defines genetic material as personal property 171-which can be
owned, transferred, and confiscated. 172 If we proceed along each of these distinct
threads, we will eventually arrive at untenable legal positions, by encountering
significant tensions among competing conceptions of rights-an area I shall refrain
from further entering at this developmental stage of the new framework for
patentability.
What is patentable then? An object, a substance, an art, an invention-any
manifestation of real property is patentable under a set of guidelines and a developed
framework that evolved over several centuries. 173 In this respect, each type of
property can be seen as an object or manifestation of an object that contains a bundle
of rights, such that a different type of property obtains a different bundle of rights. 174
Also, because each type of property differs both in its natural existence and in its
temporal manifestations, the associated bundle of rights is not identical but slightly
overlapping other bundles, such that some rights are shared amongst various nonidentical types of property. Clearly, if we bring human genome or DNA extracts or
any related derivatives or equivalent products, in the conversation surrounding
property rights, we might go down the slippery slope of conferring rights on common
heritage property. If an exclusive right is conferred on such property, it would
deprive the majority from gaining access to the common heritage. So, we are back to
square one.
Therefore, we must understand human genes as a fundamental substance,
whose rights are not deterministically based on inventions, commoditization, 175 or
corporate rights. 176 The awareness must develop that some substances are so
inviolable and fiercely fundamental that they must remain outside the property
169 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
170Mossoff, supra note 167,

at 693-96.

171 Id.
172

Id

U.S.C. § 101 (2006). See also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-10 (explaining that the
Committee Reports that accompanied the 1952 Patent Act suggested that Congress intended
"anything under the sun that is made by man" to be patentable subject matter, with exceptions for
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas).
174See B. Bjorkman & 5.0. Hansson, Bodily Rights and Property Rights, 32 J. MED. ETHICS
209, 210 (2006) (discussing how the rights that make up each bundle of rights may differ depending
on the nature of the object at issue).
175See David B. Resnik, The Commodification of Human Reproductive Materials, 24 J. MED.
ETHICS 388, 392 (1998) (discussing the commodification of genomes).
176See Leslie Roberts, Who Owns the Human Genome?, 237 SCIENCE 358, 358 (1987)
(discussing corporate interests in genetic research).
173 35
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system. 177 It is undisputed that DNA exists inside each cell of every human being
and that each of these sequences has some similarity or shared properties. So, if we
patent a particular DNA sequence, any human genome extract, or its allele, we
immediately envelope that substance with exclusivity, while denying the rights or
usage of benefits to the rest of humanity. 178 This is not only contrary to the
fundamental precepts of life, but also violates the rights of source doctrine. Under
the rights of source doctrine, if a bundle of rights are conferred upon any substance
or real property, then those rights cannot be decoupled from the source where that
property has originated. 179 If an individual instance of a human gene is extracted
from a human source and the process of extraction and subsequent data
manipulation and experimentation result in a product that during the judicial
process is determined to be patentable, is it therefore, fundamentally acceptable that
the source for that product of invention should be denied access to that product? This
is where the fallacy of the rights of source and the maximalist paradigm of gene
patent framework collide. Thus, my recommendation would be to decouple the
rights-based property discussion from the patentability argument when it comes to
determining patentability of human genome or any extract or subtract thereof.

C. Deconstructing Myriad's Product of Nature Claim
The product of nature argument in Myriad centered on a dispute between the
parties concerning the interpretation and meaning of the terms "DNA" and "isolated
DNA." 180 The court examined the question of whether "isolated DNA" covered
subject matter that was protectable by statute in the United States, in which
governing law states: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title." 181 The court systematically deconstructed Myriad's product of nature
argument along multiple threads.
First, the court provided a revised understanding of DNA in observing, "In light
of DNA's unique qualities as a physical embodiment of information, none of the
structural and functional differences cited by Myriad. . . render the claimed DNA

177See Gerald Dworkin, Should There Be Property Rights in Genes?, 352 PHIL. TRANS. R. Soc.
B. 1077, 1077-78 (1999) (referring to fundamental arguments against patent property rights in
living things).
178See id.
179 Here, I draw attention to the fundamental tension between construing rights as alienable
property and rights as inalienable inherent construct. If viewed as natural rights, we can perceive
them as absolute and inalienable and therefore, cannot be decoupled from its source. On the
contrary, if rights are seen as alienable, they are subject to regular economic trade-off related
behavior, such as bargains and negotiations. See generally Edward Andrew, Inalienable Right,
Alienable Property and Freedom of Choice: Locke, Nozick, and Marx on the Alienability of Labour,
18 CAN. J. OF POL. SC. 529 (1985) (illuminating the contradiction at the center of natural rights
debate, while illustrating the tension between the two apparently incompatible views).
1so Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 216-17.
181 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 218-19.
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'markedly different."' 182 In responding to Myriad's claim of isolated DNA having
different structural and chemical properties as opposed to native DNA, the court
reasoned that DNA is not only a chemical compound capable of encoding protein, but
it also has the ability to act as the physical information carrier. 183 The patent's
specification of isolated DNA is thus fundamentally misleading1 84 in that it does not
capture the functional aspect of the definition, as it focuses on chemical composition
analysis between isolated DNA and native DNA. Myriad challenged DNA's role as
an information carrier and instead argued that DNA referred to "a real and tangible
molecule, a chemical composition made up of deoxyribonucleotides linked by a
phosphordiester backbone." 185 While this definition explains isolated DNA, it does so
by presenting an isolated DNA that has been extracted from the human genome at a
given time from an individual source. While the chemical definition of isolated DNA
is fundamentally correct, it suffers from incorporating the expansive meaning
intended by the court.
Although isolated DNA can be identified-and with
technological advancement can be manipulated-it may not be designated as capable
of functioning explicitly the way a patent application claims it does.
This
functionality argument goes to the very core of why an isolated DNA should not be
seen as inseparable from the DNA existing in nature for the purpose of patent
eligibility discussion.
Second, the court, in addressing patentability, observed that, mere "purification"
of a naturally existing compound does not render patentability. 186 In a sharp
departure from Judge Learned Hand's 1911 observation in Parke-Davis that isolated
and purified adrenaline is patentable, the court signaled a clear shift to keep
products of nature outside the scope of patentability. 187 In disclosing that, to be
patentable, a composition must have markedly different characteristics from any
occurring in nature, Judge Sweet revised the patentability framework, based on
significant difference of the claimed invention.
Indeed, in this framework of
markedly different characteristics, there exist no fundamental distinction between
isolated and purified DNA and DNA existing in nature. The prior framework of
patenting a DNA sequence based on mere "isolation" was invalidated in Myriad as
the Judge clarified that isolation was "simply the application of techniques wellknown to those skilled in the art." 188
Third, the Judge may have foreclosed the patentability of all naturally occurring
products, in a broad stroke of rule-making, by proclaiming that discovery is of the

182Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
183 Id.
184Id. at 216. The patent specifications expressly defined "isolated DNA" as one that: "is
substantially separated from other cellular components which naturally accompany a native human
sequence [such as] human genome sequences and proteins and includes recombinant or cloned DNA,
isolates and chemically synthesize analog or analogs biologically synthesized by heterologous
systems." Id. (quoting the patent specifications for U.S. Patent Nos. 5,693,473, 5,747,282, and
5,837, 492).
185 Id.
186 Id.

at 227-28.
at 225-26 (acknowledging Judge Hand's opinion in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford
Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) but dismissing it as non-precedential).
188 Id. at 232.
187 Id.
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"handiwork of nature" and not patentable. 189
Indeed, a flawed patentability
requirement and a lack of appreciation for the technical complexities of DNA existed
in the Myriad decision. In excluding products of nature as patentable subject matter
under § 101, the district court did not arrive at this sweeping broad-brush
generalization in isolation. It reflects the Supreme Court's long-standing view that
phenomena of nature (even if just discovered), mental processes, and abstract
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.190
Thus, the reason for this exclusion is based on the
fundamental awareness of the interaction between man and its environment, in
recognizing that, sometimes too much patent protection can stymie rather than
advance the progress of science and useful arts, the constitutional objective of
patentability.

D. Examining Myriad's Deconstruction of Innovation Centric Argument
Biotechnology companies have long held that the exclusivity of patents is
required as incentive for invention or innovation. 191 Indeed, the DNA patent
community seeks to protect their exclusive rights vested in human genome patents
and advances this innovation argument on a faulty logic. Although premised on
recovering the cost of drug manufacturing and new research, the actions of these
companies have gone far beyond a basic cost benefit analysis, as has been highlighted
before. Myriad confronted this myth. If its holding stands up to upcoming appellate
reviews, no longer would biotechnology companies be allowed to extract monopoly
rent for their effort in inventing diagnostic testing in the area of genetics. Whether
Myriad's rejection of "innovation and invention" argument for patentability would
stand the test of time largely depends on three threshold questions: (i) Would
restriction to gene patenting impede development? (ii) Is patent protection necessary
to drive innovation? (iii) Will reduction in scope of patentable subject matter stymie
the advancement of science?
Indeed, patent holders have an exclusive right to use that patented invention to
derive economic benefits for a limited period, in exchange for providing full disclosure
to the patented article or invention such that other researches may benefit from
enhancing the patented product. 192 In the context of DNA patenting, new sequencing
techniques can create faster and less expensive sequences, 193 if fully disclosed to the

189 See id.

190Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("Phenomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the
basic tools of scientific and technological work.").
191E.g., David M. Gersten, The Quest for Market Exclusivity in Biotechnology, 2 NEURORX 572,
573 (2005) (discussing market exclusivity as vital to the biotechnology industry).
192 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002).
193See, e.g., Meni Wanunu et al., Electrostatic Focusing of Unlabelled DNA into Nanoscale
Pores Using a Salt Gradient, 5 NATURE NANOTECH. 160 (2009); Your Genome in Minutes: New
Technology
Could
Slash
Sequencing
Time,
SCIENCEDAILY
(Dec.
31,
2010),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/12/101220121111.htm.
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broader scientific community. This in turn can provide economies of scale to the
consuming public.
A focus away from anticommons,194 by making knowledge
accessible to more people, new vistas can be opened for the scientific community. On
the contrary, reviewing the history of patent application and post-patent disputes
perhaps gives the indication how patent holders can prevent scientific community
from accessing the anatomy of new inventions.
Admittedly, a patenting entity routinely grants licenses to other competing
organizations for use of its patent. It does so, however, on a selective basis and, quite
frequently engages in sending cease and desist letters to preclude them from
developing competing products. This is especially troublesome in the DNA patent
area, as any specific DNA sequence can be interrelated to other potential inventions
of DNA sequences, due in part to the shared interconnectivity of the human
genome-an interconnected entity. If a patent for a specifically isolated gene is
granted, the temporary exclusivity, therefore, prevents scientific organizations from
including those sequences in tests for other disease predisposition 1 95 nor does it allow
them to develop competing and cheaper diagnostic processes-thereby, stymieing the
ultimate benefits or general welfare of the public.
Another drawback of gene patenting has been unraveling in recent years, as we
witness an explosive array of extraction, sequencing, and testing of DNA being
performed at various molecular genetics laboratories. 196 Testing, at times, evolves
into laboratories resorting to predatory practices of exclusive testing for genetic
susceptibility, while extracting excessive prices for these services and without ethical
considerations for patient welfare and wellbeing. 197 Exclusivity enables patent
owners to prevent other laboratories in devising their own test or reviewing the
testing protocol of the patented entity. 198 At times, it seems no universal protocol or
framework exists to supervise testing errors. 199 This monopolistic practice by
patenting organizations is what actually can impede development, not the other way
around. 200
Therefore, hiding behind a protectionist paradigm will not provide driving force
for continued innovation in science and technology. It is the spirit of co-operation
and mutual learning that has advanced human construct incrementally towards
acquiring more meaning from existing process and objects. In addition, most of
today's scientists work in the academia under the paradigm of publish-or-perish.
194For information on the "anticommons" principle in biomedical research, see generally
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
195E.g. Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 208-10 (describing the negative effects on public research
due to patent holders); see also Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Dangers of Diagnostic Monopolies,
458 NATURE, 405, 405 (2009).
196See Hunter et al., Letting the Genome Out of the Bottle-Will We Get Our Wish, 358 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 105, 105 (2008) (describing the proliferation of genetic testing).
197 See, e.g., Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 195, at 405-06.
198 Id.

199David Magus et al., Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests: Beyond Medical Regulation? 1
GENOME MED. (Feb. 2, 1009), http://genomemedicine.com/content/pdf/gml7.pdf; Gail H. Javitt &
Kathy Hudson, FederalNeglect: Regulation of Genetic Testing, ISSUES IN SCI.& TECH., Spring 2006,
at 59.
200 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 194.
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Evidence suggests that federal grants account for a disproportionately large portion
of the innovation in science and technology in the last several decades. 201 Therefore,
the search for a new product for the benefit of mankind cannot stop if the number of
patents gets reduced, or the scope of patenting becomes restrictive, rather too much
power at the hands of a corporation, who develops a predatory practice and develops
a practice in which primacy may be given to selective products based on economic
realities, thereby excluding the invention of other utility based products.

CONCLUSION

Anchoring the trailblazer Myriad opinion penned by the district court Judge
Sweet, this article examined DNA patentability through multiple threads. While
Myriad is being hailed as the game-changer in twenty-first century patent law, this
article provided a different viewpoint-that of seeing Myriad, not in its splendid
isolation, but within a continuous contour with contemporary patent cases of Europe.
This line of enquiry has been prompted, in part by the need for convergence in patent
law across jurisdictions and in part by the recognition that, an isolated opinion can
never rise beyond shallow dogmatic discourse-something not entirely desirable in
our contemporary patent discourse.
Myriad, in the analytic framework of this article, acquired expansive meaning
for various reasons. First, by placing the opinion as part of a trifecta, I attempted to
impart a broader meaning on its holding-in observing that Myriad's adoption of
"information-first argument" is in line with the European courts' aligning of
invention with function and prescribed usage. Further, Myriad's rejection of "DNAin-isolation argument" traces the same judicial contours revealed in European courts'
invalidation of patentability of DNA outside of its natural environment. Second, I
see these cases as a response to the law's inability to synchronize technology's
advancement. Thus, following a restricted patentability framework, these cases
signal judiciary's intention to close that statutory gap in law, while reducing the
patentability scope to restrict "everything under the sun" to come under the purview
of law. Third, the Myriad case, in conjunction with these European cases, opens the
door to develop patent framework based on convergence across jurisdictions-a
crying need for many decades as claimed inventions and their stated functions can
reveal themselves across geographical borders, albeit causing differing judicial
interpretations.
Myriad, through its bold proclamation, opened new intellectual strands in
patent law. In revising the patentability requirement for gene patents, Myriad
adopted a new focus on the "markedly different characteristics" test and reinvigorated the "product of nature" doctrine-perhaps signaling the judiciary's
intention to examine patentability discussion premised at the intersection of law,
ethics, and humanity. In this article, I have attempted to examine some of these less
talked about patentability frameworks,
especially given Myriad's broader
examination, certainly calls for such discussions. Indeed, some remain unsaid, some
201See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-SponsoredResearch, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1667-69 (1996).
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unexplored.
But, Myriad's sweeping observations impinge upon a number of
doctrines that open the door for such inquiry for future work-some of which, I shall
briefly highlight.
First, Myriad reminded us that whenever exclusive rights are conferred upon a
selected few, the majority suffers. Myriad's product of nature doctrine is a fervent
reminder that a more positive outcome might result if patenting is forever foreclosed
on human genes, thereby ensuring that majority is never deprived of a common
heritage of mankind. Perhaps, the days may not be too far, when patenting of
human genes is not legally possible.
Second, Myriad can acquire meaning in distributive justice, as it informs us of
the perils of a legal process, in which exclusivity enjoyed by a selective few precludes
the majority from the utility and beneficial use of the product in contention. In
patenting a DNA sequence, sourced in human genome, we unleash a type of unequal
distribution, where every person belonging to a common heritage does not receive his
or her fair share. More specifically, in deprivation of the medical benefit that must
be conferred upon all, even if a single strand of DNA is sequenced, as it is part of
everyone's common heritage.
Third, Myriad points to a silent dichotomy in prior patentability frameworks.
Let us, for argument's sake, decouple ourselves from the invocation of the common
heritage of mankind and leave the patentability argument to rise and fall on
corporate monopoly rent-seeking behavior. If corporations intend to commoditize
gene patents, then under the minimalist framework, we should let the efficiency of
market model dictate terms, and thus, no exclusivity would be required. Logic would
dictate that this would be desirable from the market model, which would eliminate
the need for excessive patent protection. Indeed, this is not the case in reality.
Finally, Myriad and its European counterparts provided a long sought-after
clarity in gene patentability. Despite this, society's general reluctance, perhaps, in
the not so distant future, the path to patentability will begin to straddle some of the
humanistic contours identified here. In such a traversal, our ethical compass must
be guided by the realm of sacred, a sacred borne out of our longing for the common
heritage of mankind and fundamentals of distributive justice.

